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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-RIGHTS OF WITNESS
BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE.
The problems which arise from the friction-producing, yet theoreti-
cally complementary, spheres of the power of government and the rights
of the individual have vexed civilization for centuries. A small but essen-
tial segment of this problem area is the controversy which centers around
the right and duty of the law-making branch of the government to avail
itself of pertinent facts in order to aid itself in accomplishing its constitu-
tionally imposed duty of law making. Opposing this investigative power
are the rights of a witness as outlined in, and protected by, the First
Amendment: freedom to express ideas and views, privately and within
associations and its coefficient, freedom to remain silent. These two
spheres of political rights and duties have collided repeatedly, with great
force and relatively wide public attention in recent years, and the
collision has been highlighted by a sharp division in the Supreme Court -
a thin majority and a passionate, sometimes despairing dissent. The
aim of this comment is to explore this conflict and attempt to assess
the impact legislative investigations have had on the First Amendment
freedoms and to speculate as to the validity of the result.
I.
HISTORY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO INVESTIGATE.
It is important to trace the development of Congressional investiga-
tions in order to place the modern problems in perspective. The House
set up its first investigating committee in 1792 to probe for the reasons
behind the defeat of the St. Clair expedition at the hands of the Indians.
The case of Anderson v. Dunn,' twenty-nine years later, was the first
evidence of a judicial recognition that Congress possessed such a power.
Although it did not involve a congressional investigation, the court
recognized that there existed in Congress a coercive power over non-
members.2 Such a realization was basic to the development of the power
to investigate and compel process.
1. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
2. In that case, the House adjudged Anderson, not a member, "guilty of a
breach of the privilege of the House and of high contempt of the dignity and authority
of same." Although the offense committed was not mentioned by the Court, it
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Under its contempt power punishment by Congress is limited to an
imprisonment not to extend beyond the session of Congress during which
the contempt occurred.3 To provide for a more serious criminal indict-
ment against uncooperative witnesses, Congress passed a statute in 1857
which provided for added judicial sanctions. 4 In the case of Kilbourn v.
Thompson,5 although the House relied upon its own contempt power
instead of the Act of 1857, the controversy did revolve around an in-
vestigation. The House had set up a committee to inquire into the
real estate pool of the Jay Cooke Company, a debtor of the Government.
They found Kilbourn in contempt when he refused to answer questions
concerning the membership of the company and refused to produce cer-
tain papers demanded by the committee. Upon review the Court held
that Kilbourn was falsely imprisoned because the House had exceeded its
authority and had assumed a power properly exercised only by the
judicial branch. It was felt that the investigative committee's charge
was too indefinite: that it was not set up to look specifically for fraud
or crime, nor to repeal the corporate charter. The pervading tenor of the
opinion was that the House had no general power of making inquiry
into the "private affairs" of the citizen. In explication of the narrow
view the Court took, it has been noted that the broader aspects of the
investigation had not been disclosed to it: Jay Cooke Company's in-
debtedness was only part of the great administrative problem of the use
and disposition of public moneys in relation to the security demanded
for government deposits. Because the Court was unfamiliar with the
legislative practice, it failed to see that in its proper background, the
investigation was a normal and customary part of legislative process. 6
The power and scope of congressional investigation was in doubt
after Kilbourn.7 Then, starting with McGrain v. Daugherty8 in 1927, the
Court began to expand its previous thoughts and define the use of the
investigatory power. The Court there found that the power to secure
needed information is an attribute of the power to legislate and, by
3. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230 (1821) ; Marshall v. Gordon,
243 U.S. 521, 542, 37 Sup. Ct. 448, 453 (1917).
4. 11 Stat. 155, ch. 19, § 1 (1857). The current counterpart is found at
2 U.S.C. § 192 (1958): "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by
the authority of either Houses of Congress to give testimony . . . willfully makes
default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the
question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a
fine of not more than $1000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail
for not less than one month nor more than twelve months."
5. 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
6. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power of Investigation,
40 HARV. L. Rzv. 153, at 215-216 (1926-27).
7. Some certainty was added by In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 17 Sup. Ct. 677
(1897) which concerned a Senate investigation into corruption in the Senate over a
tariff bill. The Court found the subject uniquely within the jurisdiction of the
Senate; thus it held witnesses could be compelled to testify. The Court also
upheld the Act of 1857.
8. 273 U.S. 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 319 (1927). In that case, the Senate, while
investigating the Justice Department, subpoenaed a witness and issued a warrant
to obtain his personal testimony.
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necessary implication, the authority to employ compulsory process for
that purpose. The Court agreed with Kilbourn that neither House is
invested with a "general" power to inquire into private affairs and compel
disclosures. Here, however, the object of the investigation and of efforts
to secure the witness's testimony was to obtain information for legislative
purposes. Thus the Congressional power to investigate for legislative
ends was firmly established.
The last significant case of this early period was Sinclair v. United
States9 decided two years later. The Senate had authorized a committee
to investigate charges of fraud and bad faith in connection with government
lease contracts. A witness, the president of an oil company having a
government contract, refused to answer questions put to him by the
committee about a contract on the ground that they concerned his private
matters which were cognizable only in courts where suits against the
company were pending. The prime significance of this case is in the Court's
answer to this defense n pertinency grounds. The Court reiterated dicta
in McGrain that the questions must be pertinent to the subject. It felt
that the questions did not relate to the witness's private or personal
affairs and that the government had sustained its burden of proving that
the questions pertained to the matter under investigation. Thus the court
found that it was within the authorization and legitimate scope of the
investigation.
In this earlier period, therefore, the Court seemed to be concerned
with the pertinency of the question, the existence of the power of inquiry
and the process to enforce this power. Twenty years later the Court
seemed to have reorientated its approach and concerned itself more with
the rights and privileges of the witnesses. The Court thereby shifted its
emphasis from the power of the government to investigate to the right
of the individual to withhold testimony under First Amendment pro-
tection.
II.
THE START OF THE MODERN ERA OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS. THE APPEARANCE OF FIRST
AMENDMENT PROBLEMS.
The question whether a witness can refuse to answer on First
Amendment grounds was first brought before the lower federal courts
in United States v. Josephson.10 In that case a witness summoned before
the House Un-American Activities Committee refused to permit himself
9. 279 U.S. 263, 49 Sup. Ct. 268 (1929).
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to be sworn in or answer any questions. His conviction was affirmed by
the second circuit court.1'
In considering the possibility of interference with the free expression
of ideas because of fear of disclosure of unpopular ideas or beliefs, the
court felt that the fear was not created by legal restriction: "[T]here is
no restraint resulting from gathering of information by Congress . . .
which does not wholly flow from the fact that the speaker is unwilling to
advocate openly what he would like to urge under cover."12 The court
failed to examine the practical result of compelling certain testimony.
Josephson also cast strong doubt upon the "private affairs" doctrine of
Kilbourn. The court decided that un-American propaganda went to the
survival of the Government and so was not the purely personal concern
of anyone. In dissent, Judge Clark pointed up the fact that the majority
left the scope of congressional inquiry virtually unaffected by the First
Amendment. He feared the boundless authorizing resolution 3 to be not
against the danger allegedly present, but rather against all abnormal
thinking, and he was unhappy with the dire practical consequences possible.
A few months after Josephson the circuit court for the District of
Columbia - which was to decide many of the important cases in this
area - handed down its decision in Barsky v. United States.14 The
reasoning in this case proved to be the foundation for many of the
circuit and Supreme Court decisions to come. A member of the govern-
ing body of the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was subpoenaed
by the House Un-American Activities Committee to produce certain
financial records of his association and certain correspondence with per-
sons in foreign countries. The H.U.A.C. suspected that the money the
organization collected was not for relief, but for political propaganda. The
witness refused to produce the documents and refused to answer questions
relating to them. The court upheld his conviction. Although the facts and
holding were similar to those in Josephson, the rationale was different:
here the Court admitted there was an abridgement of the First Amendment,
but excused it.
The majority's view was that it would be "sheer folly . . . for an
existing government to refrain from inquiry into potential threats to its
11. The issues however were not clear. The court noted that: "The theory
seems to be that the investigation of Un-American or subversive propaganda im-
pairs in some way not entirely clear the freedom of expression guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights." United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 1947).
12. Id. at 92.
13. Commenting on the vagueness of "un-American" in the resolution authorizing
the H.U.A.C., the majority in Barsky said the "principle" of our government is well
defined, yet in Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136, 63 Sup. Ct. 1333,
1342 (1943), the Court was unable to find any essential "principle" of the Constitution.
Also, in Feinglass v. Reinecke, 48 F. Supp. 438, 441 (N.D. IIl. 1942), the court
said: "Any political idea that happens to conflict with the economic or political
notions of an individual is apt by him to be deemed un-American."
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existence or security until the danger was clear and present."' 15 In
explanation, the court distinguished between the necessity for inquiry and
the necessity for action. The latter is permissible only when the danger
is clear and present, but the former is allowed when the danger is
"reasonably represented as potential". Judge Edgerton, dissenting, took
issue. He was of the opinion that the danger must be clear and present
to justify inquiry and that there existed several alternatives for determining
when the danger was such: through the Justice Department, which en-
forces the laws; through the intelligence services; and through any new
agency that Congress may think it useful to create.16
The majority made the point that the embarrassment and damage
that would occur would not be the result of Congressional action, but of
private action flowing from the current unpopularity of the revealed
belief and activity.' 7 The dissent again cut to the heart of the argument
by noting that it was the investigation's uncovering of the stigmatizing
expressions of unpopular views, which sets up the strong deterrent to
even private expression. This is the view which later prevailed.
The one remaining and most important confli&t in the two opinions
involves the basic approach to the problem. The majority claimed that
the problem was to balance the relative necessity of the public interest
against the private rights: "Even assuming private rights of the timid
to be the fullest weight, the problem remains whether they outweigh the
public necessities in this matter."' 8 This balancing of interests tests was
fastened upon by the Supreme Court in latter decisions. Rejecting the
balance test as used by the majority, Judge Edgerton said that "the power
of investigation, like the power of taxation, stops short of restricting the
freedoms protected by the First Amendment."' 1
There were several 1949 District of Columbia cases, 20 the most
notable being Lawson v. United States,21 which followed Barsky and re-
jected a witness's contentions involving his right of privacy and freedom to
remain silent as to his beliefs and associations. In these cases the nature
15. Barsky v. United States, supra note 14, at 246.
16. By way of proof, he made this sensible statement: "As the House Com-
mittee's history shows, no dangerous propaganda that eludes other agencies is
likely to be discovered by a congressional inquiry. The investigation the Committee
conducts is unsupported by any color of necessity." Barsky v. United States, 167
F.2d 241, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
17. This position is not unlike that of the murderer who claims that the murder
occurred because of the gun and not because of himself.
18. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
19. Id. at 253. Although the Judge's statement may appear absolute in scope and
perhaps too conflicting on the investigatory power, he did indicate a solution. He
intimated that if the questioning were handled in private, much of the restriction
on speech would disappear and congressional inquiry might be permissible.
20. Marshall v. United States, 176 F.2d 473 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339
U.S. 933, 70 Sup. Ct. 663 (1950) ; Morford v. United States, 176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 934, 70 Sup. Ct. 663 (1950) ; See also United States v.
Fitzpatrick, 96 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1951).
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of communism and the Communist Party was an important rallying point
for the majorities."2
In 1952 it appeared as though the First Amendment rights of a wit-
ness before a congressional investigating committee would be resolved by
the Supreme Court one way or the other. The executive secretary of a
publishing firm was summoned to appear before a House committee in-
vestigating lobbying activities. He refused to give the names and addresses
of those who bought his books, but willingly offered all other records. The
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, when presented with
this problem in Rumely v. United States,23 avoided the main constitu-
tional problem by finding that the phrase "lobbying activities" in the
House resolution authorizing the investigation meant lobbying in its
commonly accepted sense. This therefore permitted the court to hold that
the Committee was not authorized to inquire generally into attempts to
influence public opinion on national affairs when no dire public necessity
related such to lobbying. When the case reached the Supreme Court,24
it was hoped that finally the uncertainties of the lower federal courts would
be settled. The Court, however, in a brief opinion, recognized the First
Amendment problem, but held that it would not have to decide it since
there was no authority given by the House to the committee to investi-
gate efforts to influence public opinion, and hence the questions were
improper.
Because the Court's opinion was cursory, the feeling of the court
can be better comprehended by referring to the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, which was noted approvingly by the Court.25 The majority of the
Court of Appeals was aware that the "realistic effect" of public embarrass-
ment is a powerful interference with the free expression of views, but
since a similar situation existed in Barsky, it had to be distinguished.
The distinguishing factor was the Communist Party; involved in Barsky
was the subversive character of the Communist Party, while in this case
there was no such dangerous factor. Judge Bazelton, in dissent, could find
no violation of the First Amendment, "merely because some disclosures
might conceivably deter some from implementing their political views
22. This point was strengthened by American Communication Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674 (1950). There the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a federal statute denying the services of the NLRB to any union whose officers
failed to swear that they did not belong to the Communist Party and did not believe
in the use of force for political ends. The statute made a critical distinction between
persons who believed in the use of force and violence to achieve political ends and
those who did not: the belief proscribed concerned the use of a political procedure,
and not candidates or goals of government. The Court found that the members of the
Communist Party were pledged to improper political methods. By this rationale,
the discrimination became based on the Party's threatened use of force rather than
its candidates or platform.
23. 197 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
24. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 1, 73 Sup. Ct. 528 (1953).
25. Significant in the decision at the Supreme Court level, however, was Justice
Douglas' concurring opinion, in which Justice Black joined. They felt that the
authorizing resolution did apply to the witness, but by subjecting the press to
harassment, the committee abridged the First Amendment.
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with financial support. ' '2 6  This opinion was soundly routed by the
majority's statement that "neither semantics nor syllogisms can break
down the barrier which protects the freedom of people to attempt to in-
fluence other people by books and other public writings. Such logic as
the contention possesses falls before the realities of the situation. ' 27
While the circuit court in Barsky had previously recognized that ex-
posure by an investigating committee affects constitutional rights, the
Supreme Court had not yet come to this point.28 Yet, in cases after Rumely,
starting with United States v. Harriss,29 the Court seemed to accept as an
established doctrine that the embarrassment of disclosure and exposure,
though of truth, could work a restraint on the exercise of the First Amend-
ment freedoms. The policy of avoidance of the deep constitutional issue
continued; in several other congressional investigation cases in this period
the Court limited its consideration to technical and evidentiary matters.30
In 1955, in three casess ' the Court reversed contempt convictions based on
the Fifth Amendment - indicative of the liberal approach the Court was
to take in Watkins v. United States. 2
III.
THE FIRST IMPORTANT TEST.
In 1954 Watkins a labor organizer, appeared as a witness before
a subcommittee of the H.U.A.C. At prior hearings two other witnesses
had charged that he was an active member of the Communist Party. The
witness answered these charges and candidly reported on his past political
associations and activities; he even said that he was willing to answer any
questions the subcommittee might have concerning anyone he knew to be
26. Rumely v. United States, 197 F.2d 166, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
27. Id. at 174.
28. Previously, investigations had invaded individual constitutional rights by
interfering with the abstract right to privacy and to be let alone, as in Kilbourn,
McGrain and Sinclair. The Court had showed concern with the power that the
government can exert by working on public opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 Sup. Ct. 624 (1951), but even there it had
no occasion to recognize that government exposure even of truth could affect legal
rights, as it did by implication in Rumely.
29. 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 Sup. Ct. 808, 816 (1954).
30. United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 70 Sup. Ct. 739 (1950); United
States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 Sup. Ct. 724 (1950) ; Morford v. United States, 339
U.S. 258, 70 Sup. Ct. 586 (1950) ; Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 70 Sup.
Ct. 519 (1950) ; Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 69 Sup. Ct. 1447 (1949).
31. Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219, 75 Sup. Ct. 712 (1955); Emspak v.
United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 Sup. Ct. 687 (1955) ; Quinn v. United States, 349
U.S. 155, 75 Sup. Ct. 668 (1955). In the Quinn and Emspak cases, the decision
rested on grounds (1) that the witness had properly invoked the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the question he had refused to
answer, and (2) that since the committee had not specifically overruled the
witness's objections based on the Fifth or indicated that it was overruling by
specifically directing the witness to answer, so that the witness was never confronted
with a clear-cut choice between compliance and non-compliance, there was no
basis to sustain a conviction for contumacious conduct before a committee. The
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members of the Communist Party, provided they were still members.
This proviso proved to be the stumbling block. When asked, Watkins
refused to testify about persons who in the past might have been mem-
bers of the Party but who, to the best of his knowledge, had since removed
themselves from the Party movement. Criminal prosecution was initiated
and the witness was convicted, but the Supreme Court in Watkins v.
United States reversed the conviction in an opinion by Justice Warren.
Justice Frankfurter wrote a brief concurring opinion and Justice Clark dis-
sented at length. Justices Burton and Whittaker did not take part.
The majority conceded broad powers of congressional investigation,
and then fashioned limits. A major portion of the opinion dealt with three
specific defenses: vagueness, pertinency, and the First Amendment. De-
spite the merit and eloquence of Warren's contentions, the actual holding
is probably limited to pertinency.33 Watkins is more important, therefore,
for its dicta than for its holding.
The Court of Appeals had said that Congress has the power of ex-
posure, if the exposure is incident to the exercise of a legislative function.34
But under this theory all the elements of due process can be evaded and
the personal security of individuals from arbitrary or summary punishment
becomes a fiction. Warren apparently recognized this consequence,35 but
reminded us that the solution of the problem is not to be found in the
difficult task of testing the motives of the committee members. However,
even if the individual motives could be determined, Warren pointed out,
motives alone would not vitiate an investigation if the proper legislative
purpose is being served. Since this problem reappears in later decisions,
a pause in the discussion of Watkins might be proper in order to trace the
development of this particular line of argument.
In Barenblatt v. United States"0 the Court discarded the exposure
objection by stating that so long as the Congress acts in pursuance of its
constitutional power, "the judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the
basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power."3 7 But
33. "The statement of the Committee Chairman . . .was woefully inadequate to
convey sufficient information as to the pertinency of the questions under inquiry.
Petitioner thus was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he
was within his rights in refusing to answer." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178, 215, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1193 (1957). The concurring opinion based reversal
solely on pertinency. The dissent sustained the authorizing resolution and the per-
tinency issue, but was concerned mainly over curbing the power of Congress, and
discounted the First Amendment arguments noting that there was no general
privilege of silence.
34. United States v. Watkins, 233 F.2d 681, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
35. He wrote: "We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled to be informed
concerning the workings of its government. That cannot be inflated into a general
power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of the
private rights of the individuals." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200
(1957).
36. 360 U.S. 109, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081 (1959).
37. Id. at 132.
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the dissent argued that by shaming witnesses, the committee was under-
taking a judicial function on a greater scale than that condemned in
Kilbourn.88 The majority indicated that the correction of improper mo-
tives was the responsibility of the people through exercise of the ballot.
This argument appears unrealistic, though. The preponderance of the
people - those not immediately affected by the investigation process -
could, and in fact do, condone the methods presently used, and so the
protection of the Constitution ought to come from the Court. The average
man does not have the same respect for unorthodox and controversial
groups as did the framers of the Bill of Rights. Indeed, the draftsmen
wisely refused to commit the protection of these groups to the will of the
people, but rather put their defense in the hands of the Court. Again in
Wilkinson v. United States,3 9 the Court passed over the exposure argu-
ment by quoting from Watkins and restating its position of refusing to
"speculate" as to the motivations which might have prompted the decision
to summon a particular witness. It is hoped, however, that should a case
someday arise wherein it can be shown that the intent was personal
persecution, the Court would seize on Warren's statement outlawing ex-
posure for exposure's sake so as to vitiate the apparent law-making.pur-
pose. Certainly, though, the Court would demand conclusive evidence to
reach such a result.
Returning to Watkins the majority there clearly disagreed with the
Court in Barsky which felt that the damage and embarrassment resulting
from Congressionally forced testimony concerning beliefs and associations
were due to private action. Warren's position was that the mere summon-
ing of a witness and compelling him to testify about his beliefs and ex-
pressions against his will is a measure of governmental interference.4 0
The opinion indicated that the majority was aware that it was not the
particular witness alone who suffers the consequences. Even beyond
those whom he identified and placed in the glare of publicity, there must be
concern for those who would be affected in a more subtle way; the effect
would be immeasurable upon those who would hold only the most
orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a
similar fate. If unfettered, this power of congressional investigation could
so effect an individual as to make him hesitate joining any organization
other than the local fire company or expressing disapproval of any action
of the government on any level. Warren seemed to weaken his own
reasoning, however, by perpetuating the balancing of interests test. He
carefully noted that not all inquiries are barred, despite the adverse effects
38. This line of argument was continued in Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 81 Sup. Ct. 1357, 1405 (1961).
39. 81 Sup. Ct. 567 (1961).
40. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 189, 77 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1180 (1957).
He said: "That this impact is partly the result of non-governmental activity by
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which follow upon compelled disclosure of private matters. "The critical
element," he said, "is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the
interest of Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness.""
It has been observed,42 however, that Warren probably had reference to
rights not specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights - that he referred
to a general claim for privacy in the face of a congressional demand for
information.
An interesting lower court case, United States v. Peck,43 followed
the "spirit" of Watkins. In that case the court overturned a conviction
of a witness who refused to disclose his past political associations and those
of his friends and colleagues. The balance test was used and showed that
the infringement upon his First Amendment freedoms was unjustified.
Although the court came down hard on the vagueness of the authorizing
resolution, in dicta it indicated that the only type of question to which an
answer might be compelled would be one relating to espionage, sabotage or
the forceful overthrow of the government.
Not all litigation in this area concerns Congressional investigations.
State investigations, too, have presented constitutional problems. In ac-
cordance with state legislation providing a comprehensive scheme for
regulation of subversive activities, the New Hampshire legislature adopted
a resolution authorizing the state's attorney general - as a one-man.
legislative committee - to make an investigation to determine whether any
subversive persons were located within the state. A witness was summoned
who testified at length about his past conduct and associations, but denied
he had ever been a member of the Communist Party or any program to
overthrow the government by force. He refused, however, to disclose his
knowledge of the Progressive Party in New Hampshire or of persons
with whom he was acquainted in that organization. Finally, the witness
refused to answer questions concerning a lecture he had given before a
class at the University of New Hampshire. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court affirmed a contempt conviction based on these refusals. In Swee-y
v. New Hampshire4 - decided the same day as Watkins - the United
States Supreme Court held that the conviction violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The four-man majority opinion by Warren declared that there
was unquestionably an invasion of the witness's liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political expression. The opinion reasoned that
because of the lack of any indication that the questions the witness refused
to answer fell into a category of matters upon which the legislature was to
be informed, there was an absence of authority and hence the conviction
was invalid - not in accord with due process of the Fourteenth Amend-
41. Watkins v. United States, supra note 40.
42. Redlich, Rights of Witnesses before Congressional Committees: Effect ofRecent Supreme Court Decisions, 35 N.Y. U.L. Rxv. 1127 (1961).
43. 154 F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1957).
44. 354 U.S. 234, 77 Sup. Ct. 1203 (1957).
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ment.45 Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Harlan, in
which he concluded that there was not a sufficient state interest in the
questions to warrant the intrusion upon academic freedom and privacy of
political opinion and association. The interest of the state was not
"compelling" because only a "shadow" threat to state security could be
shown in the elements of the Progressive Party. Both opinions agreed
that academic freedom is a basic right that should be guarded jealously. 46
Also underlying the conclusion in Sweezy was the fact that the Progressive
Party was considered as an ordinary political party, unlike the Communist
Party.
IV.
THE MAJORITY BECOMES THE DISSENT; THE FIRST SQUARE
HOLDING ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
Hope continued for the preservation of the First Amendment free-
doms with the Court's decision in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama.47 There the
Court held invalid a state court's finding that the N.A.A.C.P. was in
contempt for refusal to comply with the court order requiring it to
submit its membership list. The order was found to be an unwarranted
interference with freedom of group association which has a close rela-
tionship to freedom of expression in respect to both public and private
matters. 48  The state's interest in determining whether the N.A.A.C.P.
was conducting intrastate business in violation of a corporation statute
was not sufficiently related to the matter of securing a membership list to
justify its production.
The scope of this decision does not seem to be as broad as had been
first expected. That the real core of it was the factor of the deterrent effect,
as proved to the extent of a probability, may be indicated by the light in
which a state court viewed that decision. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Commission,49 a state investigating committee petitioned for
an order compelling certain answers, and production of membership lists
of the N.A.A.C.P. and other organizations. The committee sought to
justify such inquiry on the ground that the legislature desired informa-
tion as to whether members of the Communist Party or "fellow travelers"
had surreptitiously penetrated organizations active in race relations so as
45. Yet, when this case was before the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the
resolution was not considered to be so vague and lacking in standards as to violate
due process. That court also said that the witness's liberties were violated but
that the need of the information outweighed this.
46. See also Frankfurter's statements in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
73 Sup. Ct. 215 (1952).
47. 357 U.S. 449, 78 Sup. Ct. 1163 (1958). Although this case did not involve a
legislative investigation, the issues presented are pertinent.
48. The Court rioted that "freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of speech."
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460, 78 Sup. Ct. 1163, 1171 (1958).
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to justify state action on the subject. The Supreme Court of Florida
found there was no justification for the witnesses' refusal to answer whether
they were N.A.A.C.P. members, carefully distinguishing Alabama. The
distinction rested on the ground that here the witnesses baldly asserted
claims of their constitutional privilege of association with no demonstration
of infringement that would result from the attempted state action, nor
showing of the deterrent effect in any evidentiary form. In Alabama, on
the other hand, there was detailed showing of the effect on the members
of the organization, even to the point of physical danger. Further, the
interest of the state here - finding facts on infiltration by the Communist
Party-was considered "compelling", whereas this was lacking in Alabama.
This judicial attitude smacks of the one taken by Justice Frankfurter
in his concurring opinion in Sweezy. 0 Conceivably, the court in Gibson
failed to consider the Sweezy decision because it felt that the defect there
was in the manner of investigation (a one man "witch hunt" by the attorney
general), and therefore that case could not be controlling where there was
a full scale legislative commission doing the investigation.
The Gibson court, nevertheless, felt bound by the pertinency require-
ments in Watkins, and so refused to permit the commission to inspect the
whole membership list. Rather, exploration was to be restricted to a
statement by the custodian of the lists, after due reference to them,
whether specific suspected subversives were associated with the N.A.A.C.P.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to this case in a memorandum to
which Warren, Black and Douglas dissented. 51 This particular problem is
not closed, however, because the Supreme Court has recently granted
certiorari to a Florida case52 which is the outgrowth of this Gibson decision.
Complying with the order in Gibson, the Commission asked a witness to
refer to the N.A.A.C.P. membership list and advise it whether a certain
alleged subversive was listed as a member. The witness refused. The
Supreme Court of Florida sustained the conviction, noting that those
"whose otherwise subversive connections have been revealed, are not
entitled to the same associational privacy"53 as are the good faith members.
The potency of the decisions in Watkins and Sweezy, however, was
destined to dissipate in the onrush of Barenblatt v. United States5 4 and
Uphaus v. Wyman. 55 The facts in Uphaus are similar to those in Sweezy
and not unlike Alabama and Gibson. The Attorney General of New
Hampshire, as in Sweezy, was conducting a probe of subversive activities
in the state. Called as a witness, the director of World Fellowship, Inc.
50. This is so, although in Sweezy the necessary quantum of 'threat' to state
security could not be found in the Progressive Party.
51. 360 U.S. 919, 79 Sup. Ct. 1433 (1959). That this denial was after the
Court's decisions in Barenblatt and Uphaus is perhaps indicative of the restriction
put on Watkins and Sweezy by those cases.
52. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 126 So. 2d 129(Fla. 1961), cert. granted, 81 S. Ct. 1093 (1961).
53. Id. at 132.
54. 360 U.S. 109, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081 (1959).
55. 360 U.S. 72, 79 Sup. Ct. 1040 (1959).
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refused to produce the names of all persons who attended a summer camp
maintained by the organization. Clark wrote the opinion for the five-man
majority which upheld the witness's conviction; Warren, Black and
Douglas joined in a dissent by Brennan.
The Court weighed the "substantiality" of the state's interest in the
production of the documents against the individual's right to associational
privacy,56 and decided that governmental interest in self-preservation was
sufficiently compelling to subordinate the interests of the individuals in
their associational privacy. Important, however, as a qualifying agent in
this holding is that the Court carefully noted that the governmental
interest was so compelling at least to the extent that the guest registration
statute made that association "public" from its inception. This statute may
be a clear factor distinguishing this case from Sweezy (where there was no
statute requiring the Progressive Party to make public its membership).
The validity of this distinction however, does not seem convincing. The
Court appears to reason that the guests have no right to complain if their
names are revealed because the registration procedure made them aware
of the public character of the camp. The strength of this argument fades,
though, when it is remembered that the statute made the guest list
"public" only insofar as it could be inspected by a sheriff or police officer.
Certainly the guests would have assented to this small interference exer-
cised under the police power of the state, but it is doubtful whether their
acceptance would have carried over to an alleged fact-finding committee
of the legislature, and its attendant publicity.
Perhaps a further distinction between Uphaus and Sweezy is in the
proximity of the alleged communist subversion. In his concurring opinion in
Sweezy, Justice Frankfurter thought it crucial that the questions asked the
witness did not touch areas closely related to communist activities. How-
ever in Uphaus nineteen of the speakers at the camp were allegedly
connected with the Communist Party, thereby enabling the Court to find
a nexus between the guest list and suspected communist activities - enough
to subordinate the rights of the witness to the state's interest in self-
preservation. 7 It could be argued, however, that such a "connection" is
not sufficient. Neither in Sweezy nor in Uphaus did the purpose of the
investigation deal with the Communist Party or any organization which
had been proven subversive. Nevertheless, the right of the committee was
based "on the possibility that the organizations concerned might be
harboring subversive persons who in turn might be a threat to the state's
existence. The Court, therefore, while expressly disclaiming guilt by as-
sociation, would seem to lend credence to that doctrine. The link of this
56. Freedom of association, though not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,is considered within the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments byjudicial inclusion in Sweezy and Alabama.
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association to subversion and then further to the state's right of self-
preservation appears tenuous.58
There was an interesting subsequent development in this case. The
New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the Legislature still wanted
Uphaus's answers in December of 1959, notwithstanding the omission
from the New Hampshire Laws of 1957 of the provision of the Laws of
1955 authorizing the Attorney General to search for subversives.59 Uphaus
appealed his contempt conviction. The United States Supreme Court
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in a per curiam deci-
sion by Justice Brennan with a dissent by Justices Black, Douglas and
Warren.6 0 Justice Brennan felt the Court was bound by the state court's
construction of the statute even though it seemingly indicated that the legis-
lature no longer wanted the witness to produce the list of names. Carefully
noting that he had not shifted from his dissent position in the original
Uphaus decision, Brennan declared that he remained of the view that the
Court in Uphaus incorrectly sustained the contempt order, yet he felt that
decision, while it stands, also sustained the order challenged on the appeal.
Justice Douglas, in dissent, argued that the requirement to produce the
lists in question assumes that their production is relevant to some interest of
the state. Because of the change in the law, this relevancy was gone since
the attorney general was not authorized and therefore a new question was
raised. A further reason for granting the appeal was presented by Justice
Douglas. Bates v. City of Little Rock,61 decided after Uphaus, was a case
where an individual who possessed the membership lists of the N.A.A.C.P.
- as opposed to the organization itself, as in Alabama - challenged the
right of the state to demand their production in connection with an occu-
pancy license tax ordinance. The Court reversed his conviction, based on
the evidence of harm which would follow by public identification, and the
lack of a sufficient state interest. A distinction between the N.A.A.C.P.
and the World Fellowship, inasmuch as they are both law-abiding and
their members are entitled to the same freedom of speech and association,
would appear to be questionable. 62
58. An argument might even be made that the court should have carried over
into Uphaus some of the mighty pronouncements in Sweezy about how jealously we
ought to protect the principles of academic freedom. The lectures and discussions at
the World Fellowship camp, it could be argued, were a form of self-education de-
serving of an equal amount of constitutional protection.
59. See Wyman v. De Gregory, - N.H. -, 169 A.2d 1 (1961), for further
development of the controversy resolving around the change of this New Hampshire
law.
60. Uphaus v. Wyman, 81 S. Ct. 153 (1960).
61. 361 U.S. 516, 80 Sup. Ct. 412 (1960).
62. The dichotomy in the contending views can be clearly shown: Justice Douglas
notes that the Attorney General of New Hampshire stated: "Those who voluntarily and
knowingly appear with, consult with, attend functions with and otherwise act in
concert with Communists or former Communists in America cannot possibly have
any right to privacy in regard to such activities." 81 Sup. Ct. 153, 157, n.3 (1960).
Contrast with that, the view Black expressed in his dissent: "It may be true, as the
Attorney General of New Hampshire suspects, that Dr. Uphaus has at some time
been in the company of Communists or that people who have been in his camp
have been in the company of Communists. But even if it is true and those associates
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Uphaus was argued in 1957 and Barenblatt in 1958, but they both
were decided the same day in 1959. The reasoning behind Uphaus is
manifest in Barenblatt; the conviction was affirmed with the same dissent
as in Uphaus, except that Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent. Justice
Harlan's majority opinion was almost a duplicate of the form and style
prescribed by Justice Warren in Watkins. The difference is that Harlan
arrived at conclusions antithetical to those of Warren. He discussed the
three major defenses considered in Watkins: the vice of vagueness, perti-
nency to the subject under inquiry, and the evasive First Amendment.
The H.U.A.C., in the course of an investigation of alleged Com-
munist infiltration into the field of education, had subpoenaed Barenblatt,
a former college teacher. Among several questions relating to his knowl-
edge of Communist Party activities at various colleges, the witness specifi-
cally refused to answer whether he was or ever had been a member of
the Party, or whether he was a member of the Haldane Club of the
Party while at the University of Michigan. The majority opinion noted
that the First, unlike the Fifth Amendment, would not provide a right to
resist inquiry in all circumstances6 3 (relying on dicta in Watkins) and
proceeded to balance the competing private and public interests at stake.
The Court took judicial notice that the Communist Party is no ordinary
political party and imposes a definite threat to national security which
must not be overlooked. With this basis, the Court concluded that it could
not blind itself to "world affairs", and where the Communist Party was
concerned, individual rights to associational privacy had to yield to the
national interest. Thus, Barenblatt and Uphaus imply that membership
in the Communist Party causes a citizen to forfeit some of his rights.6 4
If the reasoning of the majority is carried out, one might wonder whether
the time will not soon come when the national interest, in the light of world
affairs, will outweigh the protection of the Fifth Amendment also at least
as applied to members of the Communist Party - or to believers in some
other alien, un-American ideology still unborn.
are as bad as they are suspected to be, it is my belief that our Constitution with its
Bill of Rights absolutely forbids that imposition of pains and penalties upon him for
peaceably assembling with them." Uphaus v. Wyman, 81 Sup. Ct. 153, 164 (1960).
63. The protection of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to a witness before
a congressional investigation; however the protection is perhaps not as broad as
the Court indicated. When the question is innocuous, the witness may have to give
some indication why an answer would be self-incriminating. Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190, 207, 75 Sup. Ct. 687, 706 (1955). Furthermore, the privilege
of the Fifth may be waived by testimony given prior or subsequent to the claiming
of the privilege. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). Lastly, under the
Immunity Act of 1954, 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1958), a witness may be compelled to
testify before a court, grand jury, or congressional committee in a national security
case, provided he is granted immunity from prosecution for any criminal activities
he may reveal.
64. This trend has continued. A divided Court in Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board, 81 S. Ct. 1357 (1961), decided that the Constitution
does not prohibit the requirement that the Communist Party register with the
Attorney General. In Scales v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 1469, 1473 (1961), the
Court on the same day sustained the conviction and imprisonment for six years of a
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In dissent, Black was of the opinion that the "balance test" is permis-
sible where the law primarily regulates conduct or action and only in-
directly affects speech, but not where the law directly abridges the First
Amendment. He noted that as it stands now the result of the test is in
effect that no provision of the Bill of Rights is enforced unless the Court
thinks it reasonable. Even assuming some balancing is proper, he would
favor the witness's silence; his interest in joining organizations, advocating
causes and making political mistakes should weigh more heavily. Black
thought the government could best preserve itself by preserving the
freedom to criticize or discuss all policies and to change even the most
fundamental postulates. The dissent also took issue with the majority's
position concerning the Communist Party: "No matter how often or how
quickly we repeat the claim that the Communist Party is not a political
party, we cannot outlaw it, as a group, without endangering the liberty of
all of us." 65
Watkins and Barenblatt are technically reconcilable, if the former
is restricted to its pertinency holding; Communist infiltration into labor
was not clearly established as the subject of the inquiry in Watkins,
whereas communism in education was established as the subject in. Baren-
blatt. The spirit and approach, nevertheless, are inconsistent. It is hoped
that the unfortunate difference in the facts - that Watkins could demand
more sympathy than Barenblatt due to his gentlemanly conduct before
the committee - did pot influence the judicial determination."6
Several cases decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia after Barenblatt prove helpful in determining the scope of that
decision in the eyes of the other federal courts. In Shelton v. United
States,67 the court rejected a witness's plea for special immunity as a
newspaperman from questions as to membership in the Communist Party,
and affirmed his conviction. Relying on Barenblatt, the court felt that
simply because the witness is a newspaperman does not preclude in-
quiry into his activities on behalf of the Communist Party. The court
applied the balance test and found that inquiry into the protected areas
65. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 149, 70 Sup. Ct. 1081, 1105 (1959).
66. The reversal in the position of the personnel is interesting. The majority in
Watkins dissented in Barenblatt except for Justice Harlan. Justice Frankfurter, who
concurred in Watkins, and Clark, who dissented in Watkins were in the majority in
Barenblatt. Justices Burton and Whittaker took no part in Watkins, but they
(with Justice Stewart replacing Burton) were in the majority in Barenblatt. Except
for Harlan, the position of the justices is consistent; if Harlan's switch can be
resolved, then perhaps the enigma of Watkins vis-a-vis Barenblatt can be resolved.
67. 280 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1960) cert. granted, 365 U.S. 857, 81 S. Ct. 823 (1961).
A copy editor of a N.Y. newspaper, when subpoenaed by the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee refused to answer whether he had ever had conversations with a
person identified by the committee as a Communist, and also questions regarding his
own membership in the Communist Party. Arguing his immunity, he reasoned that
such an investigation was being undertaken, or would at least have the effect of dis-
couraging newspapers from hiring persons of unpopular, unorthodox and minority
views and associations. This would constitute a violation of freedom of the press,
since it would be as effective a form of censorship as the deletion of the material the
minority groups contribute to the paper.
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must "yield to the superior right of Congress to know whether there is
a dangerous abuse of these rights."68 In Liveright v. United States 9 a
witness before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee refused
to answer whether he was an active Communist. What would appear
to be a valid objection was raised to the question: the subcommittee
could not invade his First Amendment rights to secure information which
it already had in its possession. The court answered this claim with an
unconvincing argument: "The fact that the subcommittee may have had
every item of information concerning which the appellant was interrogated
does not reduce its right or power to seek confirmation directly from
him."'70 This seems to be an outlandish progression of reasoning from the
time when a witness's rights under the First Amendment could be vio-
lated only when the interest of the government in securing vital informa-
tion was "compelling". With such argument the committee could be
permitted to subpoena citizens and subject them to the public scorn, loss of
employment and all the other unfortunate consequences resulting from a
forced disclosure of beliefs and associations, with the "compulsion" pro-
vided only by a desire to "confirm" its existing information. Apparently,




Early in 1961, the Supreme Court decided the companion cases
Wilkinson v. United States71 and Braden v. United States.7 2 Both deci-
sions were five to four.73 These cases point up the most bitter difference
of opinion on this problem in the Court to date.
While investigating Communist Party progaganda activities in the
South, the H.U.A.C. was "informed" that Wilkinson had been sent to
the area of the hearing by the Communist Party to develop a hostile
sentiment to the committee and to bring pressure upon Congress to
preclude the particular hearings. Wilkinson was summoned and asked if
68. Id. at 707.
69. 280 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
70. Id. at 714. This Court on the same day reversed the conviction of a witness
who refused to answer questions about her husband's activities and her own asso-
ciations. Before her refusal, the witness said that she knew nothing about internal
security, was not a Communist, and had no knowledge of subversion or infiltration.
The court, in Knowles v. United States, 280 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1960), reversed
not on the First Amendment, but on pertinency grounds, citing Watkins, and con-
cluding that the government had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the
pertinency of the question was so indisputably clear.
71. 81 Sup. Ct. 567 (1961).
72. 81 Sup. Ct. 584 (1961).
73. In Wilkinson, Black wrote a dissent, joined by Warren and Douglas;
Douglas in turn dissented, concurred in by Black and Warren; and Brennan wrote
a dissent, joined in by Douglas. In Braden, the division was more unified: Black
wrote a dissent concurred in by Warren and Douglas; and Douglas dissented in an
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he was a member of the Party; he refused to answer. The Supreme Court
affirmed his conviction. The Court was quick to reject the witness's
contention that his interrogation violated his rights under the First Amend-
ment. The majority felt that Barenblatt was indistinguishable7 4 and went
on to explain that it is "the nature of the Communist activity involved,
whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or illegitimate politically, that
establishes the Government's overbalancing interest. '7 5
Justice Black attacked the wisdom of the balancing test as applied be-
cause it meant that "the committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of
this Court happens to think could possibly be for a legitimate purpose
whether that 'purpose' be the true reason for the inquiry or not." 76 Under
this test, he felt almost any rationalization could be constructed to justify
almost any question put to any witness at any time. In his dissent, Justice
Douglas attacked the same point but from a different angle. He was of the
opinion that Wilkinson's association was peaceful and in no way de-
served the attack by the committee whose central aim was finding out
what criticism a citizen was making of the government. Then, Douglas
proceeded to leave a wide hole in his prohibition of the committee's action.
He noted that the question asked the witness (Are you now a member of
the Communist Party?) "in other contexts might well have been ap-
propriate. '7 7 It is not clear under what circumstances Douglas would
permit such inquiry. He clearly agreed with the dissent in Barenblatt that
the same question should have been prohibited, and there was no indication
that the committee was exposing the witness because of his criticism of
the investigatory practices of the committee. Perhaps Justice Douglas
merely wanted to point out that the absolutist approach toward the First
Amendment freedoms was not really absolute. Possibly he felt- that the
committee lacked sufficient proof of Wilkinson's Communist activities and
desired to indicate that with a full show of convincing evidence, of -such
association he might be more kindly disposed toward the committee.-
The issues raised by Braden were substantially identicaL to those
considered in Wilkinson and essentially the facts were similar.7 8  The
committee claimed to have had information that Braden was a member of
the Communist Party; this information apparently was of the same type as
relied on in Wilkinson - a flat statement by a paid informant with no
chance for cross examination. This was sufficient for the majority. The
74. In dissent, Justice Black thought that Barenblatt was distinguishable because.
there the Committee did not interrogate the witness merely for criticizing it, and here
there was no supported probable cause outside of the statement of a paid informantZ
75. Wilkinson v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 567, 576 (1961).
76. Id. at 579.
77. Id. at 583.
78. The witness was asked whether he was a Communist at the time he signed
a letter which was in the nature of a petition to Congress urging that legislative
action be taken which would help those working against segregation. The H.U.A.C.
apparently believed that Braden had drafted petitions not for the purpose of aiding
integration, but for furthering the interests of the Communist Party.
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Court concluded that information on Communist Party infiltration into
legitimate organizations in southern states was "surely not constitutionally
beyond the reach of the subcommittee's inquiry,"7 9 and so on the authority
of Barenblatt, the conviction could not be set aside on First Amendment
grounds.
In his eloquent dissent, Justice Black carried the conclusion of the
majority to its logical extreme: if the H.U.A.C. has the power to interrogate
everyone who is called a Communist, then no committee, state or federal,
will have trouble finding cause to subpoena all persons anywhere who
take a public stand for or against a major public issue.80 He summed
up his underlying theory: "Liberty, to be secure for any, must be secure
for all - even for the most miserable merchants of hated and unpopular
ideas."8 l
A recent decision of the Court might indicate a slight change in the
sharpness of the division in the Court in this area, although the Court
specifically said it did not reach the witness's First Amendment claims.
In the course of investigating Communist infiltration in the "Albany
area", the H.U.A.C. called a witness who freely answered questions con-
cerning his own activities when he had been a member of the Party at
Cornell. But he refused to give the name of a faculty member who was a
Communist, and the names of certain other people with whom he had
dealings. The lower federal courts affirmed his conviction, relying on
Barsky and Barenblatt. This was reversed in Deutch v. United States8 2
on the grounds that the witness was not made aware how the questions
related to the subject. Therefore, the Court noted, pertinency was not
established; the questions had nothing to do with the Albany area.
Perhaps the majority (the dissenters in Wilkinson and Braden, plus
Stewart) purposely bleached the facts so as to accommodate the result,-be-
cause the witness never indicated any doubt as to the pertinency of the
questions, and because of the Court's questionable, conclusion that the
trial court could not have reasonably determined that Cornell was within the
committee's terms of reference. This may signify a willingness on Stewart's
part to recede from his former position. With this in mind, it will be
interesting to see what disposition the Court will take toward the Gibson
case. s3 It is hoped that the Court will look more closely at the weights
on the balance and demand that the committee be specific in showing
that the particular question or subject bears some relationship to the self-
79. Braden v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 584, 587 (1961).
80. In a dissent written by Douglas it was felt that Braden had done nothing
more than exercise his First Amendment rights of speech, press and petition to Con-
gress, and that the government made no showing that they were a part of a matrix
for the overthrow of government: there had been no foundation for the question.
81. Braden v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 584, 591 (1961).
82. 81 Sup. Ct. 1587 (1961).
83. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 126 So. 2d 129 (Fla.
1961), cert. granted, 81 Sup. Ct. 1093 (1961). See text at note 52 supra for a
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preservation of the state. And unless this is demonstrated, the inquiry
should fall before the First Amendment.
It would appear doubtful, though, that the Court will involve itself with
First Amendment contentions at this time. Rather, it will probably seek
other avenues to resolve the case. For example, the Court may decide
that the investigating committee had not marshalled sufficient proof of
the subversive character of those into whose associational ties it was
probing. In this manner the Court could find the proper nexus with the
Communist Party was lacking. Alternatively, the Court may come down




The core of the problem is the insistence of the Court in using the
balancing test. Without even looking at the scales, the decision to sub-
mit the First Amendment freedoms to a balance might be a jolt to the
constitutional nervous system. While a general pre-eminence is conceded
to the Fifth Amendment,8 4 it is denied to the First. The result seems to
be that one might have more protection if he has committed a crime
than if he has made innocent political errors.8 5
Where there is no showing of communist activity, it seems to be
clear that the Court would never permit the First Amendment freedoms
to be overpowered by the weight ascribed to the nation's interest in self-
preservation. But when communist activity is involved, the scales tip
to favor the national interest - depending on the degree of such activity.8 6
Attacking the use of such a test are those who claim that the best way to
preserve the nation is by preserving its freedoms absolutely. 87 Alterna-
tively, balancing is also challenged by those who would argue that the
Constitution does not give an ultimate or preferred status to the right of
84. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126, 70 Sup. Ct. 1081, 1093
(1959).
85. One commentator has noted that the result is that one can defy claims of
national self-preservation in favor of his own self-incrimination, but not if he pleads
the cause of political freedom for all. Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation
Against Political Freedom, 49 CALJn. L. Rxv. 4 (1961). There may be some wisdom
in the result, nevertheless. When the individual - alone and unguarded - is
attacked, he has the fullest protection. But, when the harm is one which he shares
in common with many, the protection is perhaps less needed because a political remedy
is much more of a reality due to the strength of group pressure.
86. One writer has expressed the opinion that the European experience shows
conclusively that where facts can be ascertained only by a curtailment of the citizen's
individual freedom, there should be no hesitation in paying that price lest the freedom
of all should be endangered. See Ehrmann, The Duty of Disclosure in Parlimentary
Investigation: A Comparative Study, 11 U. CHr. L. Rzv. 1, 117, 153 (1943-44) for
a discussion of the German and French experience.
87. Justice Black in his dissent voices this view perhaps most fervently. See also
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self-preservation."8 But, even if it is assumed that some balancing is
necessary, the Court seems to dispose the weights in a position which all
but assumes the conclusion: the Court in effect places the interest the
government has in self-preservation on the one side, and, on the other,
the interest of a witness to remain silent about his affiliations with the
organization the Court has judged to be, by its nature, designed to harm the
existing government. In such a situation the result will be obvious.
Perhaps it should be remembered that the two conflicting powers stem
from different roots. The prohibitions of the First Amendment are ex-
press; the power of the congressional investigation is implied from the
necessary and proper clause. When the express collides with the implied,
the express ought survive. But, even to enforce the First Amendment abso-
lutely in this area would not strip the government of all its weapons of de-
fense. Such action would merely foreclose guilt by association, judicially or
publicly. Congress could still investigate treason or espionage. In addi-
tion, criminal sanctions remain available for those who act outside the
law.
The present position of the Court, however, may not be the malignancy
in our constitutional body that the dissenters would have us imagine.
Given the nature of the Communist threat,8 9 plus the fact that the Court
has not gone beyond this zone, there may be no real restriction placed
on freedom of speech and association by legislative investigations of this
type. The entire controversy may be merely a battleground over the legal-
political philosophy involved, rather than an attempt to keep a witness
out of jail. When, however, the protection of the Fifth Amendment
is balanced away even to a proven Communist, or when non-Communist
groups are unjustly affected, or when a witness is compelled to disclose his
beliefs, then indeed there will be grave reason for despair. There is no
interest of the state powerful enough to subordinate an individual's rights
to the point where he could be forced to condemn himself to criminal con-
viction. Likewise, when the state - regardless of the excuse proffered -
forces its way into men's minds to probe beliefs, it violates its raison
d'etre.
Arthur T. Douney, III
88. See Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Free-
dom, 49 CALIF. L. Rlv. 4 (1961). The author attributes the great weight ascribed
to the interest of self-preservation to a "paranoiac fear which, since 1919, has come
upon our national spirit as the outcome of world wars, hot and cold - a paranoia
which sees human living through a blinding and distorting haze of anxiety, of
hostility, of dread of aggression, which subordinates nearly all other considerations
to an hysterical yearning to be secure." at p. 12.
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COPYRIGHTS-CoMMoN LAW PROTECTION OF LETTERS.1
Writing a letter is a simple, relatively innocent act. Yet, just like
many other so-called simple acts, it can give rise to an amazing number
of possible consequences and legal ramifications - especially in the field
of copyright law. To point out just a few of the problems that could
arise, consider these situations:
a) A college student writes a love letter to his sweetheart, then
later terminates their relationship. Can she show it publicly to others
in order to damage his reputation? Suppose he subsequently made
slanderous remarks about her which she could disprove by showing
the letter? Does she have a legal right to publish the letter for this
purpose?
b) A soldier on the battlefront writes an inspirational letter to a
girl in his home town. When he is killed before the letter reaches
her, it receives nation-wide publicity in the newspapers and musical and
literary rights to it are sold. Do the proceeds from these sales belong
to him, and hence to his estate, since he wrote it, or to the girl since
she was the one for whom the letter was intended ?2
c) A is writing a biography of B, a famous American. Can he
include in it, without B's consent, a letter he received from B? Can
he use the information he garnered from it if he cannot reprint it
exactly? Does it matter whether B is dead or not?
These problems are varied, complex and often quite intriguing. It is
the purpose of this comment to analyze in detail the common law copy-
right interest in letters, based on established precedents in the United
States, England-and several other countries, so as to provide a basis with
which to answer these questions and others which might arise in this
field.
Copyright statutes of various countries specify methods by which a
person can apply for and obtain a copyright to protect his literary work
from unauthorized publication. Although letters are generally not specifi-
cally named as items subject to copyright protection by the statutes (even
when the statute does contain a partial listing of such items) there is
little doubt but that a letter can be formally copyrighted under the same
standards as any other kind of writing. When this is done there is rela-
tively little difficulty, for the statute at least attempts to spell out the rights
that result. However, problems can arise with the ordinary, everyday
letter since applying for copyright protection would be one of the last
concerns of the average letter writer. Yet, does the lack of a statutory
1. A draft of this comment will be entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial
Competition on phases of copyright law.
2. To see how an almost exactly similar situation was resolved, see In re
McCormack's Estates, 80 D.&C. (Pa.) 413 (1951).
COMMENTS
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1961], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol7/iss1/3
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
copyright mean that one's written thoughts, no matter how intimate, can
be paraded before the public in any manner the recipient desires? To
avoid this consequence, courts have come to the aid of the letter writer by
providing him with certain common law copyright rights.
I.
THE RIGHTS OF THE WRITER.
A.
Basic Right.
It is well agreed by the authorities in the field,3 as well as by the
decided cases,4 that the writer of a letter has the basic right 5 to prevent
publication of his letter without his consent.6 There are exceptions to
this rule but these will be discussed later. To enforce his right, an in-
junction against proposed future publication will issue upon the writer's
request.7 Thus, a letter writer may rest assured he can have considerable
control over the use his letter is put to. However, the rule that a letter
writer can enjoin publication of his letters raises two problems: First,
are all letters including business letters protected even though they have
no literary value? Second, what is meant by publication?
B.
What Letters Are Protected?
Since copyright statutes traditionally afforded protection only to
literary works, the question was naturally debated as to whether protec-
tion should be limited to letters that were literary works or that had
"literary value". Since the first two important cases in the field 8 did
3. BALL, THe LAW Olt COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 495 (1944) [here-
inafter cited as BALL]; BOWKZR, COPYRIGHT - ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 91 (1912)
[hereinafter cited as BowEER]; DRONE, THe LAW OP PROPERTY IN INUTLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS 127 (1879) [hereinafter cited as DRONE]; Fox, THic CANADIAN LAW OF
COPYRIGHT 76 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Fox]; MACGILLIvRAY, THS LAW OP
COPYRIGHT (1902); WsIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW (1917).
4. Rice v. Williams, 32 Fed. 437 (C.C.E.D. Wisc. 1887); Denis v. LeClerc, 1
Mart. (La.) 297 (1811) (the first American case on the subject) ; Baker v. Libbie,
210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912) ; King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917) ;
Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan. 402 (1818); Thompson v. Stanhope, [Chancery 1774]
2 Ambler 737, etc.
5. The same general principles governing the property of an author in his un-
published manuscript apply also to letters written in the ordinary course of corre-
spondence. DRONE 127; BOWKZR 91.
6. In Thompson v. Stanhope [Chancery 1774] 2 Ambler 737, the writer was held
not to have consented to publication, nor to have waived his right to object to it,
even though he had declined to accept the receiver's offer to return the letters and
had flatly told the latter they were his.
7. See cases cited in note 4. Naturally, the writer's rights are enforceable
against third parties, no matter how they got possession of the letters, as well as
against the addressee.
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involve letters of literary value written by famous men, 9 they were of little
assistance in answering the question. In the nineteenth century, New
York10 and one English court" required that a letter possess literary
value before they would enjoin its publication. They declared this test
of value could be met in either of two ways: either the letter should
be of literary value in itself or else its writer must be a famed literary
figure. In the latter case, any letter of the writer, no matter how trivial
or mundane, would be protected ;12 the injustice and inequality of this is
obvious and objectionable.
All subsequent cases in the United States and England, however,
have definitely overruled these cases and the proposition is now well estab-
lished that all letters, regardless of literary quality, will be protected.' 8 Even
business letters which contain only market figures should be protected
because the information they contain may be of the highest dollar value in
the marts of trade.14 One of the causes precipitating and justifying the
present rule is the difficulty the courts would have trying to determine
whether a letter has "literary value" - whatever that phrase may mean.
In other parts of the world, however, the question of the need for
literary value is not so conclusively decided. Although most of the
leading nations of the world I5 follow the view of the United States and
England, at least fourteen others, 16 including many located in Latin
America, require letters to be literary, or in some cases scientific, 17 before
publication will be enjoined. Other nations will not enjoin publication but
will hold that such is a tort,'8 a crime' or an infringement upon constitu-
tional rights.20
It seems, however, that several persuasive considerations should be
decisive in deciding this question in favor of protection of all letters re-
gardless of literary merit. These considerations are closely tied in with
the various bases upon which courts have given the writer power over his
letters.
9. Pope, involved letters of Swift and Pope, while Thompson was concerned
with letters of Lord Chesterfield.
10. Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 515 (1842) and Hoyt v. MacKenzie,
3 Barb. Ch. (N.Y.) 320 (1848).
11. Perceval v. Phipps, 2 Ves. & B. 19 (1813).
12. Wetmore v. Scovell, 3 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 515 (1842).
13. The New York cases were overruled by Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr.
(N.Y.) 49, 4 Duer 379 (1855). Accord, Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480
(1867); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912), etc.
14. DRONF, 134; 1 Fox 76.
15. Including France, Austria, Greece, Russia, India and Italy. This and all sub-
sequent references to the law of countries other than the United States, England and
Canada are taken from III WORLD COPYRIGHT 40-58 (Pinner ed. 1957).
16. Ecuador, Finland, Guatemala, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Mexico, Morocco,
Paraguay, Peru, Siam, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay.
17. Morocco, Paraguay and Siam.
18. Japan: Civil Code, art. 708.
19. Chinese Criminal Code.
20. German Constitution (Grundgesetz) articles 1 and 2.
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Sources of the Author's Basic Right.
Fundamentally, three different sources of the author's right have been
judicially recognized.
The first of these is that the author has a property right in his letters.
This doctrine was first espoused in the English case of Gee v. Pritchard,
2
'
and has been generally followed ever since.2 2 The writer's property right is
an incorporeal interest in the intangible thought and particular mode of
verbal expression in which he communicated his ideas.23 This interest
entitles the writer to equitable relief against unauthorized use by the
recipient regardless of the popular interest or special curiosity aroused in
the letter's contents, and even though it possesses no special literary
quality.24 In communicating the letter to another, the writer does not
consent to part with any property right therein; he simply gives the
receiver the privilege of reading the letter for his own benefit without any
right to make public use of its contents.25 The property right in letters,
like the property interest in more pretentious writings, rests upon the
basic principle that they are the product of labor, the fruits of which
belong to the producer. Their undoubted originality and the thought and
time expended in writing them entitles the author to all the protection
which the law gives to property.
The second basis upon which the court has granted an injunction is
that publication would be a breach of a fiduciary relationship.2 This would
be true in any of the traditional common law situations in which a fiduciary
relationship exists, 27 and probably also when a letter manifests extreme
affection between the parties.28
A third and usually silent basis for decisions is that publication would
invade a person's right of privacy. This is a right of seclusion or a right
to pass through the world without publicity, and sprang from an 1890 law
review article by Warren and Brandeis.29 One authority has said that
although no court has expressly relied on the right of privacy in re-
21. 2 Swanston 402 (1818).
22. An interesting sidelight attaches to the court's holding in this -case that the
writer has a property right in his letters and hence an injunction would issue.
Future equity courts for many, many years mistakenly took this decision to mean
that there must be a property right involved before the courts could issue an in-junction. Traces of this doctrine, which unjustifiably values property over personal
rights, can still occasionally be found today. See 29 HARV. L. Ritv. 640, 642 and 25
Micn. L. Rxv. 889.
23. King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917).
24. BALL 495.
25. DRONX 127.
26. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) ; Pope v. Curl, [Chancery
1741] 2 Atk. 342; BALL 498-99; Fox 76. India and Switzerland will also enjoin pub-
lication on this basis; see III WORLD COPYRmGH 50 & 55 (Pinner ed. 1957).
27. e.g. doctor-patient, lawyer-client, trustee-beneficiary etc.
28. BALL 498.
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straining the recipient from publishing a letter, it is apparently the
underlying motive in many decisions. 80
Whatever basis the courts use, it seems clear that they should re-
strain unauthorized publication of a letter. A partial disposition of a thing
by the true owner should not be carried beyond the intent and measure of
his assent, whether it be a case of borrowing, hiring or any other kind of
bailment contract s ' or surrender of possession. Generally a letter is sent
for the sole purpose of perusal by the addressee and any other use of it,
being contrary to and beyond the writer's assent, should be tortious and
enjoinable.3 2
Cicero, in his second phillipic to M. Antonium, elegantly inveighed
against a person who had publicly displayed letters he had received, and
illustrated the great social distaste towards such action:
This man skilled in rhetoric and belles-lettres, yet ignorant of
good manners, has produced letters which he said I wrote to him.
Whoever, having the least tincture of civility or decency, on a mis-
understanding between himself and his friend, ever produced and read
publicly the letters he had received from him? What is this but to
destroy the very life of society? How many jokes may be indulged in,
,in a letter, which when openly divulged are improper? How many
serious things, proper to be communicated in the secrecy of ones
communications, are unfit for the public eye. I thought I was writing
to a citizen and a good man, not to a VILLAIN and a THIEF.
Since all the considerations and bases for the past decisions are
completely unconnected to any question of literary merit, it logically and
properly follows that judicial protection should be extended to all letters
of every merit. The one exception should be letters which are unlawful -
those which are the means of accomplishing some unlawful purpose or
object.3 3  The law should afford no protection to something which
seeks to undermine it.34
C.
When Does Publication Occur?
Circulation before the public eye by any mass reproductive means
such as printing, mimeographing and the like would obviously constitute
publication. 85 A letter can also be published" by reading it in public,
30. BALL 499.31. Note that the recipient cannot be equated to a bailee because he has no duty
to return the letter at any time in the future.
32. Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (La.) 297, 302 (1811).
33. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Int'l Magazine Co., 294 Fed. 661 (2d Cir.
1923) ; Laidlaw v. Lear, 30 O.R. 26 (1898).
34. This is subject, however, to the limitation specified in the text at note 77.
35. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (1867).
36. Where X wrote a letter to his Bishop to be read by the latter and at least
one other person and which expurged X's wife from charges X had made against
her, X was held to have made a publication of the letter and to have lost his copy-
right interest in it. Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263 (1887).
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showing it to several persons,87 circulating copies of it,88 etc., and any
such public use is a violation of the author's rights.8 9 However, mere
receipt of the letter by the addressee does not constitute publication, 40 nor
does making copies of it for one's own use.41 The recipient does not neces-
sarily publish it when he reads it to a friend42 or to a limited circle of
friends. 48 How wide the circle may be is a question of fact in each case,
depending upon the contents of the letter and the intent of the parties.
Finally, transmission of a telegram-letter over a ticker-tape to ones
customers has likewise been held not to be a publication. 44
D.
Other Rights of the Writer.
Although there is little doubt among authorities4" that the writer
can get damages as well as an injunction when an unauthorized publication
has occurred, strangely enough not one case has been uncovered where
the writer sought damages. 46  If such a case should arise, then the
question of the letter's literary value should become relevant for the first
time, in the determination of the damages.
A right which is conjunctive to the power to prevent publication by
another is the author's right to secure a copy of his letter from the re-
cipient so that he himself may publish it.4 7 This is, however, subject
to one important limitation. The addressee is under no obligation to retain
the letters he receives and may transfer48 or destroy49 them. This is
only right, for to require a person to keep all the letters he received during
his lifetime would be a ridiculous burden. Even if he has not disposed of
them, it has been suggested that upon the writer's demand, he need only
make a reasonable search for them rather than be subject to an absolute
requirement of production. 0 In the Netherlands, it is completely dis-
37. Widdemer v. Hubbard, supra note 36.
38. British Oxygen Co. v. Liquid Air Ltd., (1925) 1 Ch. 383.
39. DRONE 131.
40. Fox 76.
41. Copyright Act of the Netherlands, Article 22.
42. Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (1912).
43. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
44. National Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 119 Fed.
284 (7th Cir. 1902). Note that this case as well as Widdemer v. Hubbard, cited in
note 36, both involve publication by the sender rather than by the recipient. When the
sender of a letter publishes it without securing a statutory copyright, he loses all
his claim to further copyright protection, for he is held to have dedicated his writing
to the public.
45. E.g. DRONZ 131.
46. The one reported case where damages were awarded involved a suit by an
addressee against a person who had wrongfully taken letters from him and shown them
to third parties, Thurston v. Charles, 21 T.L.R. 659. The fact that the addressee
recovered damages would mean a fortiori that the writer could also.
47. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.; BALL 496.
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cretionary with the holder of the letter whether he should let the writer
copy it or not 5' Although the sender could protect his right to publish by
making a copy of the letter before sending it, 52 the law in the Netherlands
would seem to unnecessarily punish the writer when a minimum of rea-
sonable effort on the recipient's part could be of great benefit to the
writer and perhaps even to society as a whole.
These rights, as well as the primary right to prevent publication
by another, may, however, belong to someone other than the writer
either through assignment or agency principles. The writer can generally
sell or assign his rights in publication to another, just as can the author
of any literary manuscript. 53 So also, a person may write a letter con-
cerning the business of another while he is employed by that person.54
In both cases-the owner of the copyright property in the letter is the
second party - the assignee or the employer 55 - rather than the writer
himself. Indeed, the right to restrain publication belongs to the employer
if the letter was apparently written in his behalf, even though the writer
was not authorized to do so."' A further situation in which the property
right is not in the person who physically wrote the letter results when a
person dictates a letter to another; the latter, who actually "writes" the
letter, obviously has no property right therein.57
E.
After the Writer's Death.
The final question dealing with the writer of a letter concerns the state
of his rights after death. All American and English litigation on this point
has involved the executor of the writer against a third party. These cases
have uniformly held that the executor can restrain publication in the same
manner in which the decedent could have done while alive.58 This leaves
the time after the executor has completed his duties unaccounted for,
however. Other countries have taken care of this contingency by providing
that the author's rights pass upon his death to his spouse and children,59
family,60 heirs,61 or relatives. 62 Often this right can be exercised only for a
definite term ranging from ten to eighty years, after which publication is
51. III WORLD COPYRIGHT 53 (Pinner ed. 1954).
52. Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927).
53. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
54. Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 53; Copyright Act of Great Britain (1911)
§ 5(1) (b) ; DRONE 132.
55. For an exploration of the problems concerning the government employee's
copyright rights, see Comment, 6 VILL. L. Rzv. 525 (1961) ; cf. Public Affairs Asso-
ciates v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
56. Howard v. Gunn, 32 Beav. 462 (1864).
57. Laidlaw v. Lear, 30 O.R. 26 (1898) ; Fox 76.
58. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912) ; Granard v. Duncan, I
Ball & B. 207 (1809) ; Thompson v. Stanhope, [Chancery 1774] 2 Ambler 737.
59. Argentina, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Paraguay and Poland.
60. Albania, Brazil and Panama.
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permitted.6 3 It is suggested that rather than impose a definite term,
a determination should be made in each case as to whether the descendants
or heirs of the writer have a reasonable need for protection against un-
authorized publication. If protection is necessary, it should be available
without regard to how long ago the writer died.
In the event of a disagreement among the heirs as to whether to allow
publication, at least three countries provide for settlement before a judicial
officer.6 4 If the heirs wish to publish the letter themselves, several coun-
tries 5 require them, unlike the writer, to get the consent of the addressee.
It is difficult to see why the addressee's interest should be promoted, so
as to require his consent for publication, merely because of the writer's
death. However, some countries such as Mexico, require even the
writer to secure the addressee's consent, and thus it is only reasonable
that this rule should be honored after the writer's death.
II.
THE RIGHTS OF THE ADDRESSEE.
A.
Right to the Letter Itself.
The previous discussion was not meant to infer that the recipient of a
letter has no cognizable interest in it. The basic undisputed right of the
addressee is his right to keep the letter itself - the paper on which it is
written.66 As one authority describes it, unqualified delivery of a letter
gives the recipient the exclusive right to read and keep it for its enduring
memories and cherished sentiments, or if he chooses, to destroy it.67
In sending the letter without express or implied reservation the sender
donates to the addressee the special property in the physical or material
substance on which the letter is written.68 As mentioned before, the re-
cipient can destroy the letter if he sees fit since he is not subject to the
unreasonable burden of retaining all the correspondence he receives.
Although the physical property in a letter belongs to the recipient,
it is not subject to seizure by his creditors in insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings 69 nor is it taxable as personalty. 70 The bankruptcy exemption
63. Poland and Turkey have ten year limits; Argentina and Paraguay have
twenty years, Rumania thirty and Colombia and Panama eighty years.
64. Argentina, Italy and France.
65. Bulgaria, Brazil, Greece, Italy and Turkey.
66. See cases cited in note 4.
67. BALL 496.
68. Id. at 497; Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (1867); Ipswich
Mills v. Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927).
69. Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967 (1849); Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass.
599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912); Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N.E. 887 (1907);
Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 198 (1861); Woolsey v. Judd, 11 How. Pr.
(N.Y.) 49 (1855).
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is probably founded on the same philosophy which awards exemptions to
other intimate personalty of the bankrupt.71
Upon the recipierit's death, the letters do not become assets of his
estate.7 2 Although they pass to his personal representatives, they are not
saleable in the course of administration to pay decedent's debts.73 This
is due to the fact that only property which has vested absolutely in de-
cedent's hands at the time of his death can become assets in the hands of
his administrator or executor, and the recipient of a letter has no such
absolute property therein. 74 One court, in holding that letters could only go
to the widow and the next of kin, made the somewhat gruesome analogy
of comparing them to the coffin, shroud and apparel of the deceased. 75
B.
Addressee's Right to Publish.
The sender's general right to prevent publication is subject to
definite limitations which arise either from the nature of the letter or the
circumstances under which it was received. An examination of these
exceptions to the general rule is in order at this point.
a) Use in Judicial Proceedings: For the purpose of public justice,
the production of private letters in the hands of the recipient may be com-
pelled76 and hence a quasi-publication will result. This power of com-
pulsory production will not avail if the letters would tend to incriminate
the one producting them (self-incrimination) 7 7 or if the letter is a
privileged communication.78 Also the production must be for a public
tribunal and not for the private court of a secret order.7 9 It does not
matter how the letters were obtained, however, as long as it was not by
an illegal search and seizure.80
b) Vindication of Character: Closely tied in to the previous point is
the recipient's right to publish in order to vindicate his own reputation.
Thus, where he has been slandered, misrepresented or publicly charged
with misconduct by the writer, the recipient can publish the letter or
71. Comment, 46 YALz L.J. 493, 495 (1937), suggests this reasonable conclusion;
the existence of the exemption naturally depends on state law.
72. BALL 497.
73. Ibid.
74. Id. at 498.
75. Eyre v. Higbee, 22 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 198 (1861).
76. Barrett v. Fish, 73 Vt. 18, 47 At. 174 (1899); King v. King, 25 Wyo.
275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917); Hopkinson v. Lord Burghley, (1867) L.R. 2 Ch. App.
447; Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402 (1818).
77. Barrett v. Fish, .jupra note 76. Query as to whether this right is violated
when the government searches all of a corporation's records, including its letters,
in looking for possible criminal anti-trust violations. Might not this be a constitutional
violation even if the letters were not later introduced into evidence?
78. BOWKZR 93.
79. In King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917), the court prohibited
the compulsory production of letters before the secret tribunal of the Eastern Star
Lodge.
80. Barrett v. Fish, 72 Vt. 18, 47 AtI. 174 (1899).
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such parts of it as are necessary to reestablish his character. 81 This right,
however, is personal and cannot be transferred to, or exercised by, a third
person. 82 This right of vindication has been criticized as contrary to the
fundamental principle of property on which many cases are decided."s
It is contended that publication for vindication is not a property right
and makes the receiver the sole judge of whether the wrong is real or
fancied - thereby empowering him to inflict a possibly greater wrong
on the writer than he himself is subject to. This argument concludes that
the law gives other remedies for injury to reputation. 4
c) Writer's Express or Implied Authorization: If the author of a
letter authorizes persons other than the recipient to read it, this is con-
sidered a publication and the recipient can show it to others as well.85
Also, letters may be sent under such circumstances as to justify, by
implication, the public use or publication of them by the recipient. For
example, in the absence of any contrary expression, the writer of a letter
to the editor of a newspaper or magazine impliedly consents to its
publication." The editor may publish it and alter it so long as the
alterations do not affect the credit or reputation of the writer,8 7 but it
would seem that this would be subject to the writer's right to withdraw it
before publication. 8
So also the style, address etc. of a letter may imply that it is to become
the sole property of the addressee. In Mayor of New York v. Lent,89
a letter from George Washington addressed to the "Honble. The Mayor,
Recorder, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York," which
was sent to express Washington's gratitude for an honor bestowed upon
him by the city's common council, was held to be the absolute property
of the addressee.
81. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841); Woolsey v. Judd,
11 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 49 (1855); Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263 (1887);
Phillip v. Pennell 11902] 2 Ch. 577, 76 L.J.R. (Ch.) 663; Perceval v. Phipps, 2 Ves.
& B. 19 (1813). But cf. Lytton v. Devey, 54 L.J. Ch. N.S. 293, 52 L.T.N.S. 121.
82. DRONE 138; if the equities are strong enough, the addressee could conceivably
even publish a letter written by someone other than the slanderer, in order to vindicate
his character.
83. Ibid; probably this argument overstates the power of the addressee, for the
existence of an absolute privilege (which it claims the addressee has) is quite uncom-
mon in the law nowadays. It is likely courts would only find a qualified privilege.
84. In the Canadian case of Cookson v. Poutney, (1937) 81 S.J. 528, the court
held that it would be slow to agree that protection of the copyright of letters which
state, rightly or wrongly, that a crime has been committed, is contrary to public
policy. If this court was not inclined to allow publication of letters which showed
a crime had been committed, it quite probably would also oppose publication for
vindication of character.
85. Widdemer v. Hubbard, 19 Phila. 263 (1887).
86. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (C.C. Mass. 1841) ; Barrett v. Fish, 72 Vt.
18, 47 Att. 174 (1899) ; King v. King, 25 Wyo. 275, 168 Pac. 730 (1917).
87. Springfield v. Thame (1903) 89 L.T. 242; Lee v. Gibbings (1892) 8 T.L.R.
773; Hogg v. Kirby (1803) 8 Ves. 215.
88. Laidlaw v. Lear, 30 O.R. 26, 28 (1898).
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Finally, publication and transfer are impliedly allowed when a letter
is essentially only an autograph by a famous person.90
d) Other Situations: The addressee has also been allowed to publish
without the writer's consent where publication aided the progress of
science 9' and where the letter was written by a government officer for the
public's benefit.9 2 Furthermore, the addressee who is writing a biography of
the sender may include the information he has garnered from the letters the
writer sent to him, even though he can not reprint them verbatim. 93
C.
Right to Recover from Third Parties.
Another right of the addressee is his right to recover letters wrong-
fully taken from him by third parties.94 However, if a letter is written with
the view that a third person as well as the addressee should read it,
the third person has been held not to be guilty of a crime by taking it out
of the addressee's post office box and opening it,95
D.
Unusual Types of Letters.
Throughout this comment, the term "letter" has been used quite
freely and loosely. There are, however, many quasi-letters or special types
of letters which might create a doubt as to whether they are encompassed
within the generic term "letters". It has been quite firmly established
that telegrams are letters and hence governed by the same law.9  Al-
though there have been no cases uncovered dealing with postcards, there
should be no doubt but that they fall solidly into the category of letters,
despite the somewhat unavoidable "publication" to which they are subject.
Carbon copies of a letter which the writer retains are naturally his exclusive
property, subject to no rights of the addressee. 97 Imaginary letters (such
as found in a novel) should not be considered as letters, but as literary
works subject to ordinary copyright laws. Likewise, letters that embody
a will must be produced by the person claiming under them, and should be
governed by the law relating to wills rather than letters.
90. Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 97 N.E. 109 (1912).
91. This rule prevails in Mexico and Siam.
92. See Comment, 6 VILL. L. Rzv. 525 (1961).
93. Phillip v. Pennell, [Ch. 1907] 2 Ch. 577.
94. Dock v. Dock, 180 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 411 (1897) ; Oliver v. Oliver, 11 C.B.N.S.
139 (1861).
95. United States v. Tanner, 6 MacLean 128 (C.C. Ohio 1854).
96. Kiernan v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co., 50 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 194(1876); National Telegraph News Co. v. Western Union, 119 Fed. 284 (7th Cir.
1902).
97. Ipswich Mills v. Dillon, 260 Mass. 453, 157 N.E. 604 (1927).
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As stated initially, the area of protection of letters is one that has
been governed by common law, rather than statutory, copyright prin-
ciples. Actually, a few states and territories have passed elementary
statutes concerning the rights to a letter.98 These acts, however, are
merely superfluous restatements of the most obvious pinciples and add
absolutely nothing to the existant common law. It is submitted that
statutory enactments are unnecessary in this field. Though the litigated
cases on the topic are relatively fewer than might be expected, the courts
of the United States and England have generally done an admirable job in
formulating a set of consistent guiding rules and should be allowed to
continue to do so in the future, unhampered by inflexible statutory
requirements.
Frederick M. Lavin
98. North Dakota's statute is typical: "Letters and other private communications
belong to the addressee, if addressed and delivered, but cannot be published without
the consent of the writer or by authority of the law. NORTH DAKOTA IV. CODE,
c. 47-07 §§ 47-0704-0709 (1943). Similar statutes are found at CALI*. CIVIL CODE,
Div. 2, pt. III, tit. 2, c. 3 § 980-85 (1872); MONT. CoDxs ANN., tit. 67, c. 11,
§§ 67-1104-1109 (1947); S. DAK. CODE, tit. 51, § 51.0804-09 (1939); GUAM CIVIL
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